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The Charter Balance against
Unscrupulous Law and Order
Politics
Don Stuart
I. UNSCRUPULOUS LAW AND ORDER POLITICS
OF THE HARPER GOVERNMENT
Politicians have always been seduced by the expediency of law and
order politics. There are few votes in being soft on crime. Former Liberal
Governments twice passed anti-gang legislation in a day without committee consultation on the eve of federal elections. But the level of
discourse and dogged resolve by the Harper Government to use its
majority to toughen the criminal law, whatever the consequences and
ignoring the advice from numerous experts, has reached new lows.
I first need to justify the deprecating use of the adjective “unscrupulous”.
On January 29, 2010, five new Senators were appointed. A Department
of Justice press release of that date has Minister of Justice Nicholson
saying:
The Prime Minister’s action has not only brought additional talent and
expertise to the Senate; it has greatly strengthened our efforts to move
forward on our tackling-crime agenda. The opposition has obstructed
that agenda in the Senate, most notably by gutting Bill C-15 — a bill
proposing mandatory jail time for serious drug offences, and a key part
of the government’s efforts to fight organized crime.1


Professor, Faculty of Law, Queen’s University. Many of the views expressed in this
paper first appeared in articles or annotations in the Criminal Reports, D. Stuart, Canadian Criminal
Law: A Treatise, 6th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2011) or Charter Justice in
Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Scarborough, ON: Thomson Carswell, 2010).
1
Department of Justice, News Release, “Ministers Welcome New Senators to Help Support Law-and-Order Bills” (January 29, 2010), online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/nrcp/2010/doc_32473.html>.
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In the same press release, Minister Paradis says: “These five new
Senators support all our measures. And today, we ask the opposition
parties to listen to the victims of crime and to support our measures,
too.”2
On March 12, 2012, Bill C-10, the Safe Streets and Communities
Act,3 was finally rammed through Parliament, with the government
imposing unseemly time limits on debate of the Bill both in Parliament
and at the committee stage. The government had packaged together a
variety of crime-fighting measures. This omnibus bill pushed through
nine previous bills introduced when the Harper Government did not have
a majority and which had been the subject of opposition amendments. By
and large, Bill C-10 was presented and passed without those opposition
amendments. The legislation inter alia:
•

introduces mandatory minimum imprisonment sentences for
possession of illegal drugs for the purposes of trafficking and all sex
offences against children;
stiffens sentences for violent youth crimes;
ends conditional sentences (allowing for house arrest) for a number
of offences, including all sexual offenders;
eliminates pardons (now called record suspensions) for a number of
offences; and
creates new civil remedies for victims of terrorism.

•
•
•
•

The government consistently defended its action by saying it was
listening to victims and police and had the support of the majority of
Canadians. Interestingly, when the government recently abolished the
long-gun registry,4 it went off message, ignoring and attacking the views
of victims’ groups and police associations. Whatever its pragmatic pitch,
the present government now never mentions the presumption of innocence, the right to a fair trial and the need to use the blunt instrument of
the criminal sanction with restraint.
In the committee processes, such as they were, academic experts
from Canada and abroad were mocked and ignored. Evidence from
2

Id.
Bill C-10, An Act to enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to amend the State
Immunity Act, the Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Youth Criminal
Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and other Acts, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., 2012
(assented to March 13, 2012), S.C. 2012, c. 1 [hereinafter “Bill C-10”].
4
Bill C-19, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Firearms Act, 1st Sess., 41st Parl.,
2012 (assented to April 5, 2012), S.C. 2012, c. 6 [hereinafter “Bill C-19”].
3
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criminologists that crime rates5 are declining and that there is no evidence that stiffer sentences deter had no impact. In response to a 2009
Statistics Canada report that 95 per cent of Canadians surveyed were
satisfied with their personal safety from crime, Mr. Nicholson resorted to
his now familiar and aloof mantra that “[w]e don’t govern on the basis of
statistics.”6
The government did not respond to the Canadian Bar Association’s
100-page brief voicing concern about the rigidity and unfairness of
mandatory minimums, the stress on incarceration, and the effect of these
measures on disadvantaged groups, especially Aboriginal Canadians.7
They also were not moved by the testimony of Howard Sapers, the
Correctional Investigator, that:
Some of the amendments will almost certainly have disproportionate
impacts on Canada’s more marginalized populations, including
aboriginal peoples, visible minorities, those struggling with addictions
and substance abuse problems, and the mentally ill. Indeed, nearly all
the growth in the correctional population over the past decade can be
accounted for by these groups.8

Also ignored was a coalition of U.S. law enforcement officials,
judges and prosecutors which called on the Senate committee to reconsider the mandatory minimum sentences. They concluded that, “[w]e
cannot understand why Canada’s federal government and some provincial governments would embark down this road.”9
Former senior officials have now spoken out in an extraordinary
show of unison and bravado. David Daubney, a long-time senior Department of Justice advisor, noted that: “[since] the mid-2000s, the
Justice Department has asked for less and less research to be undertaken

5
Statistics Canada figures for 2011 show that crime rates have reached their lowest level
since 1973.
6
Kim Mackrael, “Though Canadians feel safe, Conservatives move ahead on crime bill”
The Globe and Mail (December 1, 2011), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/
though-canadians-feel-safe-conservatives-move-ahead-on-crime-bill/article4246898/>.
7
House of Commons Debates, Consideration of Senate Amendments, 089 (March 5, 2012),
at 1029 (as summarized by Jack Harris, M.P. (N.D.P.)).
8
House of Commons Debates, Consideration of Senate Amendments, 093 (March 9, 2012),
at 1005 (quoted by Jack Harris, M.P. (N.D.P.)).
9
House of Commons Debates, Consideration of Senate Amendments, 084 (February 27,
2012) (quoted by Irwin Cotler, M.P.O. (Liberal)).
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and typically ignores recommendations against policies such as mandatory minimum sentences or prison expansion.”10
John Edwards, former commissioner of Correctional Services Canada, Willlie Gibbs, former chair of the Parole Board of Canada and Ed
McIsaac, former executive director of the office of the Correctional
Investigator, issued a joint press statement11 against the Harper tough on
crime agenda. They ask: “In a country that prides itself on fairness,
compassion and pursuit of equality, why do we accept the idea that
community safety will be enhanced through increased incarceration?”12
Noting the existing reality of current double and treble bunking in federal
and provincial jails, and the acceptance in the United Stated and the
United Kingdom that minimum sentence regimes have been costly
failures that have not made the public safer, they conclude that: “Criminal justice legislation that increases prison populations while draining
resources from community programs in mental health, education, child
poverty and social services makes absolutely no sense.”13
In its resolve to pass Bill C-10, the government steadfastly refused
opposition requests for cost estimates for the much greater resort to
imprisonment. A 95-page study14 by the office of Ken Page, Parliament’s
independent budgetary officer, estimated the cost of drastically restricting conditional sentences (just one aspect of the Bill C-10) at $137
million per year for provincial governments and $8 million for the
federal government. Both Ontario and Quebec have indicated they will
not pay the costs of implementing Bill C-10.
So, the record shows that the government arrogantly rejected the advice of a broad cross-section of experts and government officials and
simply persistently relied on its self-styled lie that the Bill will make
Canadians safer.
Canada is now one of the few Western countries that does not have
an independent Law Reform Commission or a Sentencing Commission
to keep track of sentencing realities and options. I have long seen the
need for legislation to simplify and make more principled our substan10
Kirk Makin, “Crime bill threatens to undo decades of reform, former MP warns” The
Globe and Mail (February 14, 2012), online: <http://m.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/crimebill-threatens-to-undo-decades-of-reform-former-mp-warns/article545747/?service=mobile>.
11
J. Edwards, W. Gibbs & E. McIsaac, “Jails don’t keep people out of jail” The Globe and
Mail (January 5, 2012), online: <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/jails-dont-keeppeople-out-of-jail/article1357501/>.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Released on February 8, 2012.
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tive, procedural and evidentiary laws. In the case of sentencing, principles were inserted into the Criminal Code in 1995,15 but since then
governments, and especially now the Harper Government, have ignored
them in the rush to impose minimum penalties. There are now 40. A
conference at the Faculty of Law at Queen’s University in 199816 sought
unsuccessfully to revive previous efforts towards principled simplification by the Law Reform commission, a Canadian Bar Association Task
Force and others. I have long favoured a General Part for substantive
principles.
However, having seen the government in action these last several
years, I am now resistant to any such efforts unless there is a commitment to delegate the task to a truly independent body where wellrespected judges, lawyers and academics are well represented. I am not
optimistic. Emeritus Professor Marty Friedland17 has recently called for
comprehensive legislation to simplify the laws of evidence, but he too
wants the effort controlled by judges, not politicians.
Pending that independent type of initiative, our entrenched Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,18 interpreted by an independent judiciary, offers the best hope for a better balance. Hopefully, this check will
not itself gradually dissolve with increasingly more conservative appointments being made to the Supreme Court. Justice Michael Moldaver
was recently chosen for elevation from a group of distinguished criminal
experts on the Ontario Court of Appeal, likely because he had stepped
out of his neutral judicial role to speak out strongly against what he
called frivolous assertions of Charter rights for accused, noting that
Charter issues were now mostly settled.19
The Harper Government is no fan of the Charter, but has often rather
piously pronounced its commitment to the rule of law in Canada and
other countries such as Afghanistan and Libya. Our government should
be proud of our judiciary and of our distinctive Charter. A good start
would be a bill to remove sections of the Criminal Code that have long
15

S.C. 1995, c. 22, s. 6. See especially Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, ss. 718-719.
See D. Stuart, R.J. Delisle & A. Manson, Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law
(Toronto: Carswell, 1999).
17
Martin L. Friedland, “Developing the Law of Evidence: A Proposal” (2011) 16 Can.
Crim. L. Rev. 37.
18
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
19
In my view, the problems he identified were seriously exaggerated and hardly spoken as
a guardian of the constitution. See Don Stuart, “The Charter is a Vital Living Tree and Not a Weed
to be Stunted — Justice Moldaver Has Overstated” (2006) 40 C.R. (6th) 280.
16
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been declared unconstitutional. Parliament has not got round to deleting
the unconstitutional objective “ought to have foreseen” element for
murder under section 229(c) of the Criminal Code. On at least three
occasions, which were embarrassing for the justice system, section
229(c) in its unconstitutional form was left with juries. This necessitated
new trials in British Columbia, Ontario and New Brunswick. In R. v.
Townsend,20 Chiasson J., speaking for the British Columbia Court of
Appeal said:
I cannot leave these reasons without wondering why steps have not
been taken to amend the Criminal Code to conform to the now 20-yearold decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Martineau determining
that language in s. 229(c) is unconstitutional. The law that is recorded
in the statute, on which every citizen is entitled to rely, is not the law of
the land. An issue such as arose in this case should not occur. It creates
the risk of a miscarriage of justice and the potential need to incur
significant costs addressing an error in an appellate court with the
possible costs of a new trial, assuming one is practical. In my view,
failure to deal appropriately with such matters by updating the Criminal
Code to remove provisions that have been found to offend the
Constitution is not in the interests of justice.21

There are numerous provisions in the Criminal Code, such as abortion provisions, some reverse onuses and parts of the defence of duress,
which have been declared unconstitutional and should be deleted.
Persons within and without Canada should be accurately informed by our
Criminal Code as to our operating justice system.

II. JUDICIARY ACHIEVES BETTER BALANCE THAN PARLIAMENT
IN ASSERTING CHARTER STANDARDS
1. Principles of Fundamental Justice
In the last 30 years, the Supreme Court has used section 7 to establish a large number of Charter standards. Substantive standards now
include:

20
21

[2010] B.C.J. No. 1802, 261 C.C.C. (3d) 320 (B.C.C.A.).
Id., at para. 43.
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9.
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subjective mens rea for a few crimes such as murder, attempted
murder and war crimes;22
a marked departure standard for crimes based on objective fault;23
due diligence with the onus reversed for regulatory offences which
affect the liberty interest;24
physical voluntariness for acts;25
moral involuntariness for justifications and defences;26
laws must not be too vague and must allow sufficient room for legal
debate;27
laws must not be overbroad in using means more than necessary to
achieve their objectives;28
laws must not be arbitrary;29 and
laws must not be disproportionate.30

Procedural standards established under section 7 include:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

pre-trial right to silence arising on detention;31
principle against self-incrimination;32
residual category of abuse of process;33
right to full disclosure of Crown case;34
right to have evidence preserved;35
22

R. v. Martineau, [1990] S.C.J. No. 84, 79 C.R. (3d) 129 (S.C.C.); R. v. Logan, [1990]
S.C.J. No. 89, 79 C.R. (3d) 169 (S.C.C.); R. v. Finta, [1994] S.C.J. No. 26, 28 C.R. (4th) 265
(S.C.C.).
23
R. v. Beatty, [2008] S.C.J. No. 5, 54 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.). The ruling on the facts was,
however, remarkably generous to the accused. He veered into the wrong lane, killing three persons,
and offered no real explanation other than that he might have nodded off after a day working in the
sun.
24
Reference re Motor Vehicle Act (British Columbia) s. 94(2), [1985] S.C.J. No. 73, 48
C.R. (3d) 289 (S.C.C.); R. v. Pontes, [1995] S.C.J. No. 70, 41 C.R. (4th) 201 (S.C.C.).
25
R. v. Daviault, [1994] S.C.J. No. 77, 33 C.R. (4th) 165 (S.C.C.); R. v. Ruzic, [2001] S.C.J.
No. 25, 41 C.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C.).
26
R. v. Ruzic, ibid.
27
Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Canada (Attorney General),
[2004] S.C.J. No. 6, 16 C.R. (6th) 203 (S.C.C.).
28
R. v. Heywood, [1994] S.C.J. No. 101, 34 C.R. (4th) 133 (S.C.C.); Canadian Foundation,
ibid.
29
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 86
C.R. (6th) 223 (S.C.C.).
30
Ibid.
31
R. v. Hebert, [1990] S.C.J. No. 64, 77 C.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.).
32
R. v. P. (M.B.), [1994] S.C.J. No. 27, 29 C.R. (4th) 209 (S.C.C.).
33
R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, 44 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
34
R. v. Stinchcombe, [1995] S.C.J. No. 21, 38 C.R. (4th) 42 (S.C.C.); R. v. McNeil, [2009]
S.C.J. No. 3, 62 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).
35
R. v. La, Vu, [1997] S.C.J. No. 30, 8 C.R. (5th) 155 (S.C.C.).
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right to effective assistance of counsel;36 and
duty to give reasons to allow for appellate review.37

This list of section 7 standards is strikingly long. Some accuse the
unelected judiciary of having been too activist and having exceeded its
original Charter mandate. In my judgment, this long list of standards has
provided salutary checks and balances against the current lure and
expediency of law and order measures.
Canada should be particularly proud of its often quite distinctive and
nuanced constitutional standards of fault. There is no evidence of
rampant acquittals as a result. Fault standards are in place, however, to
avoid injustice in borderline cases and to allow judges on occasion to use
the criminal sanction with restraint. The policy foundation for these
standards were laid by Dickson J. in the pre-Charter case of R. v. Sault
Ste. Marie (City).38 Policy arguments in favour of some form of fault for
even minor crimes39 outweighed those favouring administrative and
enforcement expediency.
Some see the ability of judges to strike down laws for arbitrariness,
overbreadth, vagueness or gross disproportionality as alarming. The
leading judgment is now the unanimous ruling of the full Supreme Court
powerfully written and justified by McLachlin C.J.C. in PHS Community
Services.40 The prohibition of drug possession under the Controlled
Drugs and Substances Act41 was held to engage the rights to life and
security of the person of the clients and staff of Insite, Vancouver’s
supervised injection site. The Court held that the prohibition itself did not
violate principles of fundamental justice as overbroad because the
Minister’s power under section 56 to grant an exemption meant that it
could be limited to appropriate circumstances. However, the Supreme
Court unanimously held that the Minister’s refusal to grant such an
exemption to the Vancouver safe injection site was not in accordance
36

R. v. B. (G.D.), [2000] S.C.J. No. 22, 32 C.R. (5th) 207 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Sheppard, [2002] S.C.J. No. 30, 50 C.R. (5th) 68 (S.C.C.).
38
[1978] S.C.J. No. 59, 3 C.R. (3d) 30 (S.C.C.), reasserted as a common law principle in
Lévis (City) v. Tétreault, [2006] S.C.J. No. 12, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 420 (S.C.C.).
39
Chief Justice Dickson would likely have resisted recent proposals to make parking and
potentially minor provincial offences subject to monetary penalties (Administrative Monetary
Penalty System (AMPS)) determined by administrative officials rather than judges: Law Commission of Ontario, Modernization of the Provincial Offences Act: A New Framework and Other
Reforms. Final Report (August 2011), online: <http://www.lco-cdo.org/POA-Final-Report.pdf>.
40
Canada (Attorney General) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] S.C.J. No. 44, 86
C.R. (6th) 223 (S.C.C.).
41
S.C. 1996, c. 19.
37
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with principles of fundamental justice, as it was arbitrary and also
grossly disproportionate in its effects. The remedy was to order the
Minister to grant an exemption. Some media commentary has predicted
that this ruling will lead to a more activist role for the courts in striking
down legislation. One senior judge, who wished to remain anonymous,
was quoted42 as saying that the Court had “opened a can of worms” and
that many judges were “uncomfortable” in the role of assessing the
effectiveness of governmental policy. It is true that the tests for finding
breaches of fundamental justice under section 7 have been lowered and
may seem unruly. The Court here identified three separate Charter
challenges: arbitrariness, gross disproportionality and overbreadth. In R.
v. Malmo-Levine,43 the majority had called for considerable deference to
legislative choices and had asserted a test of gross disproportionality for
challenges based on vagueness or overbreadth. Not so here. The separate
head of gross disproportionality is also confusing. Apart from its important role as a test for cruel and unusual punishment, the concept seems
more appropriate as a consideration under a section 1 demonstrably
justified reasonable limit analysis. However, a section 1 inquiry can only
proceed where a Charter breach has been identified and established.
It does, however, seem doubtful, given past judicial history in the
Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal, where such challenges have
usually been quickly dismissed, that the judicial patterns will now
radically change. The evidentiary record will rarely be as clear and
uncontested as it was in the Insite case. It showed the effectiveness of
Insite in reducing severe health and public safety risks in a particularly
vulnerable population. Furthermore, Vancouver Health and police
authorities, and the municipal and B.C. provincial governments, all read
the evidence as favouring the maintenance of the Insite Clinic. It was
only federal government law-and-order ideology that did not.
As for procedural standards, the duty to disclose established in R. v.
Stinchcombe44 is one of the best demonstrations of the power of an
entrenched Charter to produce positive change. For years, prosecutors
and Attorneys General had resisted disclosure rights and regimes, but we
now know that full disclosure encourages guilty pleas and that non-

42

The Globe and Mail, October 11, 2011.
[2003] S.C.J. No. 79, 16 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.). See also R. v. Clay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 80,
16 C.R. (6th) 117 (S.C.C.).
44
[1995] S.C.J. No. 21, 38 C.R. (4th) 42 (S.C.C.).
43
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disclosure has been a major factor in wrongful conviction cases.45 There
are strong arguments that disclosure requirements are costly and cumbersome in mega-trials. However, these can often be avoided or lessened by
sound prosecutorial discretion to sever trials into smaller groups, and by
forceful management strategies by experienced trial judges.
2. Power of Judicial Stay for Unreasonable Delay under Section
11(b)
One of the most important Charter checks is the enforcement of the
section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time. After the decision
in R. v. Askov46 on institutional delay, thousands of trials were stayed,
particularly in Ontario. The Supreme Court got cold feet given the public
outcry. In R. v. Morin,47 the Court adjusted the tests to include consideration of: the factor of seriousness of the offence; no strict comparison of
jurisdictions test; and putting the burden on the accused and deciding that
prejudice to the accused was the controlling factor. Section 11(b) stays
were quickly reduced to a trickle.
In the last five years or so, stays have been on the rise again across
the country with an Askov-like crunch looming in British Columbia48 and
are already a reality in Montreal in a recent mega gang trial.49 The reality
of lengthy unconstitutional delays due to lack of resources in the form of
too few judges, too few Crown attorneys and insufficient legal aid, is a
powerful indicator that law and order rhetoric to toughen criminal laws is
easy and effective politics but seldom accompanied by allocation of
sufficient resources to the judicial or prison systems. Without the
infusion of adequate resources, victims will undoubtedly suffer in not
having a chance to see justice done. Section 11(b) stays bring this
hypocrisy to a head, and a delay crisis, as in the aftermath of Askov, will
force governments to find new resources for the justice system.
On June 4, 2009, the Supreme Court in R. v. Godin50 handed down a
unanimous judgment upholding the trial judge’s stay of a sexual assault
45
See, e.g., Nova Scotia, The Marshall Inquiry: Royal Commission on the Donald Marshall, Jr., Prosecution, (Halifax: Government of Nova Scotia, vol. 1, 1989), at 238-42.
46
[1990] S.C.J. No. 106, 79 C.R. (3d) 273 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Askov”].
47
[1992] S.C.J. No. 25, 12 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morin”].
48
In R. v. Blattler, [2012] B.C.J. No. 300, 25 C.R.R. (2d) 290 (B.C. Prov. Ct.), Steinberg J.
stayed an Internet luring charge for unreasonable delay and lamented the shortage of judges.
49
Gangsterism charges were stayed against 31 of 155 alleged Hell’s Angels members in
Auclair v. R., [2011] Q.J. No. 6103, 86 C.R. (6th) 155 (Que. S.C.).
50
[2009] S.C.J. No. 26, 67 C.R. (6th) 95 (S.C.C.).
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charge because of a 30-month delay between the date the accused was
charged with sexual assault and the date set for trial. Writing for the
Court of seven justices, Cromwell J. noted that this was a straightforward
case, that virtually all the delays were attributable to the Crown and were
unexplained, and that the length of delay risked prejudice to the right to
make full answer and defence. This decision has the potential to further
revitalize the section 11(b) right in several respects. The Court is far
more accepting of the realities facing defence counsel seeking an early
trial where court and Crown resources are lacking, placing a strong
burden of justification of delay back on the Crown (in marked contrast to
the approach in Morin) and not requiring evidence of actual prejudice
(again in contrast to the ruling in Morin on the facts). The decision
deserves to be carefully examined and applied.51
3. Carefully Balanced Standards for Policing
There is now a significant record of case law since the enactment of
the Charter to suggest that our courts do a better job than Parliament in
their non-political forum in balancing civil liberties of the accused
against the need for effective police powers. The Hunter v. Southam
Inc.52 presumption that warrantless searches are contrary to section 8,
detailed Charter standards for strip searches53 and the new pronouncement in R. v. Grant54 that detention or imprisonment that is unlawful is
necessarily arbitrary and contrary to section 9, are each highly indicative
of the power of the Charter to force change which limits the powers of
the police. The case law is often complex and sometimes inconsistent.
The other reality is that Criminal Code amendments have tended to be ad
hoc and often too complex and unclear.
In Hunter, Dickson, C.J.C. saw the judiciary as the guardians of the
Constitution and that the Charter was in place to constrain rather than
authorize governmental power. There is no doubt now that, in resorting
to the ancillary powers doctrine over the years, the Supreme Court has
actually authorized a number of new police powers. This occurred, for
51
There are signs that Ontario Courts are not applying the rigour of Godin, as pointed out
by Steve Coughlan in his forthcoming C.R. annotation to R. v. Lahiry, [2011] O.J. No. 5071, 2011
ONSC 6780 (Ont. S.C.J.) (cited with approval in R. v. Tran, [2012] O.J. No. 83, 2012 ONCA 18
(Ont. C.A.)). See also R. v. Khan, [2011] O.J. No. 937, 2011 ONCA 173 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal
refused [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 195 (S.C.C.).
52
[1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Hunter”].
53
R. v. Golden, [2001] S.C.J. No. 81, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 679 (S.C.C.).
54
[2009] S.C.J. No. 32, 66 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.).

24

SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d)

example, in the case of the limited power of investigative detention,55 the
roadblock stop power,56 emergency entries57 and the use of sniffer dogs.58
Some argue59 that the problem with the ancillary powers doctrine is
that it is a fact-specific ex post facto inquiry which is vague and speculative, and that it should be left to Parliament to allow for full democratic
processes. Both citizens and police officers need to know which powers
the state possesses in advance. But what of Parliament’s record of almost
always favouring arguments of law and order expediency and listening
only to police and prosecutor lobby groups?
Consider the issue of police use of sniffer dogs. The Binnie test of
individualized reasonable suspicion in R. v. Kang-Brown60 to limit the
use of police sniffer dogs in routine criminal investigations is a welljustified and pragmatically sound solution to making such a police power
Charter compliant. Parliament has not bothered to attempt any regulation
before (or since). Justice Binnie is also persuasive in holding that it
seems far too late for four justices on the Court in that case to now reject
the use of the ancillary powers doctrine. The horse is well out of the
barn. The choice of a reasonable suspicion standard is indeed a reduction
in the Hunter standard of reasonable and probable grounds. But the
important and key aspect of the focus of all but one of the justices on an
individualized standard is that police cannot just rely on police hunches
and “Spidey sense”.61 These may mask arbitrariness and discriminatory
behaviour, as long ago pointed out by Doherty J.A. in R. v. Simpson.62
There are still concerns, expressed most forcefully in the writings of
Professor David Tanovich,63 that our courts should do more to address
the well-documented and corrosive aspect of racism in our justice
system.
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Ferdinand, [2004] O.J. No. 3209, 21 C.R. (6th) 65 (Ont. S.C.J.) as lacking an objective basis for
reasonable suspicion. See similarly recently R. v. Brown, [2012] O.J. No. 1569, 289 O.A.C. 327
(Ont. C.A.).
62
[1993] O.J. No. 308, 20 C.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).
63
See, for example, D.M. Tanovich, The Colour of Justice: Policing Race in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006).
56

(2012), 57 S.C.L.R. (2d) UNSCRUPULOUS LAW AND ORDER POLITICS

25

4. Robust Discretionary Remedy of Exclusion of Evidence under
Section 24(2)
Of course, there are ongoing concerns as to whether the standards for
policing are in fact being applied by police and implemented by courts,
and that is why the Grant decision on section 24(2) is so important and
encouraging.
The approach to section 24(2) changed with the bellwether rulings of
the Canadian Supreme Court in R. v. Grant,64 and R. v. Harrison.65 In
Grant, a 6-1 majority rejected the Collins/Stillman conscripted/nonconscripted dichotomy as too rigid for a discretionary power, hard to
apply and yielding inconsistent results. It asserted a discretionary
approach with revised criteria and emphasis. The Court arrived at a
revised discretionary approach to section 24(2), free of rigid rules but
placing special emphasis on the factor of seriousness of the breach rather
than the seriousness of the offence or the reliability of the evidence. The
same criteria are to be applied to all cases of Charter breach. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that where the trial judge has considered the
proper factors, appellate courts should accord considerable deference to
his or her ultimate determination.
In a joint judgment McLachlin C.J.C. and Charron J. (Binnie, LeBel,
Fish and Abella JJ. concurring) settled on the following revised template:
When faced with an application for exclusion under s. 24(2), a court
must assess and balance the effect of admitting the evidence on
society’s confidence in the justice system having regard to:
(1) the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct
(admission may send the message the justice system
condones serious state misconduct),
(2) the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected
interests of the accused (admission may send the
message that individual rights count for little), and
(3) society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its
merits.

64
[2009] S.C.J. No. 32, 66 C.R. (6th) 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grant”]. The Court built on
the earlier analysis of Arbour J. in R. v. Buhay, [2003] S.C.J. No. 30, 10 C.R. (6th) 205 (S.C.C.)
respecting the exclusion of non-conscripted evidence.
65
[2009] S.C.J. No. 34, 66 C.R. (6th) 105 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harrison”].
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The court’s role on a s. 24(2) application is to balance the assessments
under each of these lines of inquiry to determine whether, considering
all the circumstances, admission of the evidence would bring the
administration of justice into disrepute.66

According to the Chief Justice and Charron J., the words of section 24(2)
capture its purpose: to maintain the good repute of the administration of
justice. Viewed broadly, the term “administration of justice” embraces
maintaining the rule of law and upholding Charter rights in the justice
system as a whole. The phrase “bring the administration of justice into
disrepute” must be understood in the long-term sense of maintaining the
integrity of, and public confidence in, the justice system. The inquiry is
objective. It asks whether a reasonable person, informed of all relevant
circumstances and the values underlying the Charter, would conclude
that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute. Deterring police misconduct is not the aim although it could be a happy windfall.67
In R. v. Côté,68 an 8-1 majority of the Supreme Court strongly reasserts
the approach to section 24(2) it declared in Grant and Harrison. Faced
with an exclusion decision for multiple Charter violations in an investigation of a domestic murder case, the Quebec Court of Appeal arrived at
a compromise along the lines of the now rejected Collins/Stillman
dichotomy: the conscripted evidence of statements should be excluded,
but the non-conscripted reliable evidence (here forensic evidence found
in a warrantless search contrary to section 8) was to be admitted as the
murder offence was serious. According to Cromwell J. for the Supreme
Court majority, the Quebec Court of Appeal had first erred in intervening
on the basis that the police had not deliberately acted in an abusive
manner. The Court had exceeded its role by its recharacterization of the
evidence, which departed from express findings by the trial judge of
deliberate and systemic police misconduct not tainted by any clear and
determinative error. The Court of Appeal had also erred in interfering
with the trial judge’s section 24(2) determination by assigning greater
importance to the seriousness of the offence. Justice Cromwell powerfully reasserts that, once there has been a determination on the first and
second Grant factors that the Charter violation or violations were
66

Grant, supra, note 64, at para. 71.
Id., at para. 73. Compare the pro-state view of the majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
that the exclusionary remedy in that jurisdiction requires evidence that exclusion will deter this type
of police conduct in the future (Herring v. U.S., 129 S. Ct. (U.S. 2009)).
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serious, the factors of the seriousness of the offence, the reliability of the
evidence and the importance of the evidence to the Crown’s case, are not
determinative and should not lead to admission.
Most Canadian academics have welcomed the abandonment of the
dichotomy between conscripted and non-conscripted evidence.69 The
abandonment of the Collins/Stillman trial fairness yardstick has admittedly set up an inconsistency with the separate discretion to exclude
under section 11(d) to ensure a fair trial which the Court recognized in R.
v. Harrer.70 This rarely exercised discretion is mostly applied in trials in
Canada where the Charter breach occurred outside our borders. The
Harrer jurisprudence needs to be reconsidered and made consistent with
Grant.
There can be no doubt now that Grant has put in place a robust discretionary exclusion remedy for section 24(2). Surveys now indicate that,
across the country, trial judges are likely to exclude for Charter violations
in roughly two out of every three cases for all types of Charter breaches
and whatever the type of evidence.71 Appeal courts are less likely to
exclude. Of course, the discrepancy between trial and appeal courts may
be explained by the reality that courts of appeal are more likely to be
confronted by selective Crown appeals against exclusion decisions by
trial judges based on unreasonable errors. And Côté sends an unmistakable message that, absent errors, appeal courts should defer to rulings by
trial judges.
The importance of this reality should not be exaggerated. In the vast
majority of criminal trials across the country, Charter issues are not even
raised, and often, where they are, Charter violations are not found. But it
is the reality that, in hundreds of rulings each year where Charter
violations are found, the section 24(2) remedy of exclusion is now
69
See D. Stuart, Charter Justice in Canadian Criminal Law, 5th ed. (Scarborough, ON:
Thomson Carswell, 2010), at 595-97 and authors there cited. See also S. Penney, V. Rondinelli & J.
Stribopoulos, Criminal Procedure in Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2011), at 557-73.
David Paciocco, “Section 24(2): Lottery or Law — The Appreciable Limits of Purposive Reasoning” (2011) 58 Crim. L.Q. 1 [hereinafter “Paciocco”] is, however, less enthusiastic about the new
regime and expresses concerns inter alia about too much discretion for trial judges and the
discounting of the factor of seriousness of the offence.
70
[1995] S.C.J. No. 81, 42 C.R. (4th) 269 (S.C.C.). See further Paciocco, id., at 22-23,
39-43 [hereinafter “Harrer”].
71
See Mike Madden, “Empirical Data on Section 24(2) under Grant” (2010) 78 C.R. (6th)
278 (and see also “Marshalling the Data: An Empirical Analysis of Canada’s Section 24(2) Case
Law in the Wake of R. v. Grant” (2011) 14 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 229). For a similar Quebec survey,
see Thierry Nadon, “Le paragraphe 24(2) de la Charte au Québec depuis Grant : si la tendance se
maintient!” (2011) 86 C.R. (6th) 33.
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regularly invoked. The success rate is similar to that for applications for
section 11(b) stays for breaches of the right to be tried within a reasonable time. In section 24(2) cases, it is clear that trial judges are to be
concerned not only about truth concerning guilt or innocence, but also
about the truth that police officers are often proved to be deliberately
flouting, careless or ignorant about Charter standards. If there is a
concern about exclusion of highly probative evidence, the question
should be directed against the apparently lax and ineffective training of
police officers respecting Charter standards, even where they are clearly
established. If the police learned to apply Charter standards, then there
would be no possibility of exclusion. The police disregard for the Charter
in Côté, a serious but routine domestic assault investigation, is shocking
and an affront to the rule of law, as found by the trial judge, Cournoyer J.
In Hudson v. U.S.,72 Scalia J., writing for a 5-4 majority, refused to
apply the exclusionary rule to a violation of the Fourth Amendment
“knock-and-announce” rule. He suggested that the exclusion remedy
may no longer be necessary because of the increasing professionalism of
police forces, with wide-ranging reforms in education, training and
supervision, better internal discipline and various forms of citizen review.
Policing and review standards have improved in Canada as well.
However, those preferring alternative remedies, such as civil suits and
police complaints procedures, now bear a heavy burden of demonstrating
their comparative efficacy. In Canada, they have thus far generally
proved to be a poor and low-visibility response to systemic problems of
police abuse or ignorance of their powers under an entrenched Charter.
Police are rarely, if ever, disciplined for Charter breaches. Civil litigation
is expensive, uncertain in outcome and, if successful, likely to be subject
to confidentiality agreements. Civil litigation is also highly unlikely
where the plaintiff is in prison. In Vancouver (City) v. Ward73 the Supreme Court recently recognized a new right to sue civilly for compensation for a Charter breach but pragmatically restricted the remedy to
superior courts.74
Thankfully, our Supreme Court in Grant and Harrison saw the need
for a vigorous remedy of exclusion for serious Charter breaches, however serious the crime. In this area as in others, our Supreme Court,
72
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mindful of its role as guardian of our Constitution, has given our criminal
justice system a welcome balance against law and order expediency. In
considering exclusion remedies, courts must be especially concerned
with the long-term integrity of the justice system if Charter standards for
the accused are ignored and/or operate unequally against vulnerable
groups, such as persons of colour and those who are young.75

III. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF CHARTER STANDARDS
Chief Justice Dickson, in a visit to the Faculty of Law at Queen’s
University, once suggested that academics are most impressive in
criticizing but less so in offering constructive changes. In that spirit, I
offer five suggestions for change to better respect the rights of the
accused.
1. The Test for Exclusion under Section 24(2) Should Be Clarified
Respecting the Issues of Discoverability and Good Faith
Justice Cromwell in Côté holds that discoverability is a factor relevant to the first two Grant factors but not determinative. In that case, the
fact that the police could have acted in compliance with the Charter made
the violation and invasion of privacy more serious. Justice Cromwell
repeats a line in Grant that trial judges should not speculate about
discoverability. Whether the police would have discovered the evidence
is necessarily speculative. Surely it would be better for the Court to
abandon this unprincipled and confusing inquiry? The focus should be on
what the police did, not on what they might have done. Discoverability
should always, as in Côté, amount to a “catch 22” for the Crown: if the
police did not have to break the Charter standard, their breach is more
serious.
There is also room for greater clarity on the issue of police “good
faith”. According to the Court in Grant, “good faith” on the part of the
police will mitigate the seriousness of the violation, but “ignorance of
Charter standards must not be rewarded or encouraged and negligence or
wilful blindness cannot be equated with good faith”.76 It would also have
75
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been preferable had the Court in Grant expressly disavowed the utility of
the politically and emotionally charged labels of good or bad faith, which
have produced uncertainty and inconsistency.77 Judges are very familiar
with deciding whether conduct was intentional or negligent. A Charter
breach should be considered especially serious where the police have
intentionally breached a Charter standard and serious where the breach
was negligent. Police misperception or ignorance of Charter standards
should only mitigate a Charter breach where the Crown has shown due
diligence by the police in their attempt to comply with Charter standards.
2. There Should Be a Better Balance of the Rights of Accused and
Complainants in Sexual Assault Cases
Although there are now calls to recognize new legal and constitutional rights for victims and complaints that the accused have too many
rights, there is room for considerable caution and concern. Thus far, the
Supreme Court has avoided recognizing general Charter rights for
victims. This is as it should be. A criminal trial is about determining guilt
and the just punishment of accused, not about personal redress for
victims. What, for example, if the input of victims were to be determinative on the issue of sentence? It surely would be unjust to have the length
of a prison sentence determined by whether the victim wants revenge or
compassion. It seems clear that a general right of representation of
victims at trial, even on the determination of guilt, would hopelessly
burden and confuse an already overtaxed and under-resourced criminal
justice system.
Thus far, the enforceable Charter rights for victims are those of privacy and equality for complainants, but only in sexual assault cases. The
recognition of enforceable section 15 equality rights came by mere
assertion in the context of access to medical records in R. v. Mills,78
without any consideration of the 10-part test the Court had earlier
established in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)79 to assess section 15 claims. In R. v. Shearing,80 however, a 7-2
77
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majority of the Supreme Court ruled that defence counsel ought to have
been allowed to cross-examine a complainant in a sexual assault trial as
to a lack of reference to abuse in her diary, of which the accused had
gained possession. According to Binnie J. for the majority, the view of
the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the court below that the balance
had shifted from the rights of accused to the equality rights of complainants was wrong, “even in terms of production of third party records”.81 In
Shearing there is no mention in the majority judgment of the unruly and
unworkable principle that there is no hierarchy of rights, and the language of privacy and equality rights for complainants seems to be
deliberately softened to that of “interests” and “values”. The general
approach in Shearing82 is a welcome recalibration of the balance of the
rights of the accused and those of complainants in favour of the right to a
fair trial. The Court ought to return to serious analysis of this section 15
issue in the sexual assault context, now that it has in R. v. Kapp83 unanimously backed off the 15-part Law test in favour of a simpler test of
whether the distinction based on enumerated or analogous grounds
creates a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice or stereotyping.
The implications of an enforceable section 15 right for complainants
in sexual assault cases has been left unexplored. The policy issues are far
wider than establishing rights for protection of therapeutic and other
records of complainants. Can complainants now seek status to be
represented throughout a sexual assault trial? Why is representation
allowed in the case of access to records but not rape shield hearings?
What of such rights for principal witnesses in other gendered crimes such
as domestic assault?
In the context of criminal law the enshrinement of section 15 equality rights has had a far greater and welcome impact when there is no
attempt to claim an enforceable right, but a reliance instead on “equalitylite” arguments of the need to be respectful of equality values. This has,
for example, allowed the Supreme Court in R. v. Tran,84 respecting the
partial defence to murder, to rule obiter that the individualized approach
to the ordinary person test must be respectful of Charter values against
discrimination so that homophobia and honour killings cannot ground
provocation defences.
81

Id., at para. 132 (emphasis in original).
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The balance needs to be addressed in the context of our rape shield
laws. Unlike any country in the Western world, Canada’s rape shield
protection applies, ever since a further assertion by McLachlin J. in R. v.
Seaboyer85 and now according to the Criminal Code, equally to prior
sexual history with the accused. The Supreme Court in R. v. Darrach86
upheld the statutory regime as constitutional, but it left ambiguities such
that the law is not clear. The Court found that the rules in section 276(1)
are not blanket exclusions and may lead to admission under the criteria
of section 276(2). Can that lead to admission on the issue of consent?
Consent is often the central issue in sexual assault trials, especially since
the Supreme Court in R. v. Ewanchuk87 so drastically narrowed the
defence of mistaken belief in consent. The problem is that Darrach is
self-contradictory, indicating at one point that such evidence would never
be admissible on the issue of consent as it is not relevant and, at another,
that such evidence is rarely admissible to show consent.
There is a consistent line of authority, especially in the Ontario Superior Court (reviewed in R. v. Strickland 88 and see earlier R. v. Temertzoglou89), to admit prior evidence of sexual conduct with the accused to
show “context”. Admitting that evidence is “part of the context” seems
very like the “part of the narrative” ruse often resorted to, to bypass
unwelcome evidentiary rules.90 The real problem is that the twin myth
hypotheses are too rigid. David Paciocco91 suggested judges read them
down to forbid only general stereotypical inferences and to allow
inferences specific to the case. This was the approach taken by Fuerst J.
in Temertzoglou. This solution is rather like that adopted by the Supreme
Court in R. v. Handy92 for similar fact evidence: pattern evidence of the
accused can exceptionally be admitted as evidence of specific rather than
general propensity. The Paciocco analysis found favour in lower courts
but was not squarely addressed by the Supreme Court in Darrach.
In R. v. A. (No. 2),93 the House of Lords somehow read Darrach as
not applying rape shield principles equally to prior sexual history with
85
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the accused. The Law Lords unanimously declared that new United
Kingdom rape shield laws offended fair trial rights in the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms94 in applying with equal force to prior sexual history with the
accused.
Following the Kobe Bryant rape trial acquittal in the United States,
Dean Michelle Anderson has called for restrictions on evidence of prior
sexual history with the accused in U.S. jurisdictions.95 But she accepts it
as a given that:
prior negotiations between the complainant and the defendant regarding
the specific acts at issue or customs and practices about those acts
should be admissible. Those negotiations, customs, and practices
between the parties reveal their legitimate expectations on the incident
in question.96

My sympathy is with trial judges attempting to ensure in appropriate
cases that sexual assault trials are fair to both the accused and the
accuser.
3. Charter Rights for Accused Should Not Depend on Their Being
Asserted
One of the key Charter rights is the right to counsel under arrest or
detention under section 10(b). One of the early compromises the Supreme Court made was to decide that,97 while the informational right to
be advised of the right to counsel is automatic, implementation duties,
such as the requirement for police to stop questioning before a reasonable opportunity to consult counsel has been provided, only arise where
the right to counsel is asserted. The right may also be lost if the detainee
does not continue to assert it with reasonable diligence. This means that
assertive and criminal law savvy suspects get a full panoply of rights
while the most vulnerable — those who are ignorant of their rights, naïve
or just plain scared — get nothing. The Stinchcombe right to full disclo-
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sure98 is also triggered by a request. How this works out for an unrepresented accused is uncertain.
4. The Court Needs to Reconsider Its Decidedly Pro-State Balance
in Its Much-Criticized Interrogation Trilogy of Oickle,99 Singh100
and Sinclair101
The vehemence of the protests of the dissenters in Singh and Sinclair
is palpable and, in my view, justified. In Sinclair, Binnie J. fires the most
direct salvo:
What now appears to be licenced as a result of the ‘interrogation
trilogy’ [Oickle, Singh and now Sinclair] is that an individual
(presumed innocent) may be detained and isolated for questioning by
the police for at least five or six hours without reasonable recourse to a
lawyer, during which time the officers can brush aside assertions of the
right to silence or demands to be returned to his or her cell, in an
endurance contest in which the police interrogators, taking turns with
one another, hold all the important legal cards.102
[W]hen the decisions are read together the resulting latitude allowed to
the police to deal with a detainee, who is to be presumed innocent,
disproportionately favours the interests of the state in the investigation
of crime over the rights of the individual in a free society ...103

According to LeBel and Fish JJ. (with Abella J. concurring), the suggestion of the majority
[t]hat our residual concerns can be meaningfully addressed by way of
the confessions rule thus ignores what we have learned about the
dynamics of custodial interrogations and renders pathetically anaemic
the entrenched constitutional rights to counsel and to silence.104

When the pre-trial right to silence was first recognized by McLachlin
J. in R. v. Hebert105 under section 7, the Court used strong language.
There was a need in the Charter era to move beyond the old common
98
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law’s focus on reliability to allow judicial control of police interrogation,
abuses and tricks. The detainee had a fundamental right to choose
whether to speak to police. The Court held that the police trick of
sending an undercover officer into a cell to overcome the assertion of the
right to silence violated section 7 and should result in exclusion. There
was no consideration of involuntariness. The Court was pragmatic in
limiting the right in that context to arise only on detention and to preclude only active eliciting “functionally equivalent to interrogation” as
later characterized in R. v. Broyles.106 The majority in Hebert refused to
require that the detainee be advised of the right to silence. In the context
of undercover officers, this decision seems wise; otherwise, all types of
undercover work would have been effectively outlawed.
It has long been accepted that advising the accused of a right to remain silent is not a requirement of the voluntary confession rule, but a
lack of warning may be taken into account in determining voluntariness
(R. v. Boudreau107). At common law, the right to silence operates, held
Abella J. for a unanimous Supreme Court in R. v. Turcotte,108 to allow no
adverse inferences to be drawn from pre-trial silence lest it be a “snare
and delusion” to advise the accused of the right to remain silent and then
to use it against someone who exercises it.
Although there is still strong rhetoric in the majority opinion in Sinclair about the apparently fundamental section 7 right to choose not to
speak to known police interrogators, there is no Charter requirement that
the accused be advised of that right and no remedy contemplated
irrespective of voluntariness if that right is breached. As pointed out by
the dissenters in Sinclair, a major disappointment is that, as in Singh, the
detainee repeatedly asserting the right to silence and/or right to consult
counsel will not in itself lead to a Charter remedy under section 7 or
section 10(b). That is apparently not a “snare and delusion”. A right
without a remedy is meaningless. The Hebert section 7 right to silence
against proactive questioning by undercover agents in cells is therefore
now the anomaly.
For controls on normal police interrogation in custody, the majority
places its trust on what the majority in Sinclair call the “broad” voluntary
confession rule set out in Oickle. The problem is that the Supreme Court
confirmation of rulings on voluntariness on the facts of Oickle and Singh
106
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gives no comfort for those seeking such judicial control on aggressive
interrogation determined to get the detainee to confess at all costs. Bright
and committed detectives have been given a huge authority to use tricks,
inducements, lies, polygraphs and psychological techniques largely free
of scrutiny by lawyers and even in the face of multiple assertions of the
so-called right to silence.
The newly reconstituted Supreme Court should reconsider especially
their rulings that one brief consultation with duty counsel satisfies
section 10(b),109 in order to give better meaning to the right to silence.
However, the trilogy is of course binding, and even narrow majorities
often are hard to get reconsidered or changed.110 The hope for a better
balance may well lie with trial judges presiding over voluntary confession voir dires. Under Oickle, it should be recalled, and this was not
emphasized in Sinclair, a confession must be excluded if oppressive
conditions resulted in involuntariness or, irrespective of involuntariness,
if the police tricks were “shocking”. The latter is a high hurdle, but it
does give judges a direct remedy of exclusion for egregious interrogations. Prior to Oickle, Ketchum J. in R. v. S. (M.J.)111 excluded a confession in part because the videotape revealed Calgary police were using the
oppressive atmosphere and psychological brainwashing Reid method
pioneered in the United States, which should not, he held, be accepted in
Canada. That method is currently in widespread use and emphasized in
police training. It should result in judicial controls in egregious cases.
Some judges112 have recently linked their decision to exclude a confession to a consideration of an inadequate discharge of the section 10(a)
obligation to advise of the reason for arrest or detention. Some judges
might wish to resort to the little-known automatic exclusion rule for
evidence obtained by mental or physical torture to be found in section
269.1(4) of the Criminal Code.

109
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5. The Protection against Cruel and Unusual Punishment under
Section 12 Needs to Be Revitalized and Used to Strike Down
Disproportionate Minimum Penalties
In R. v. Ferguson,113 McLachlin C.J.C., on behalf of a unanimous
Supreme Court, decided that constitutional exemptions were not available as a remedy for mandatory minimum sentence. Paul Calarco114 sees
a silver lining for defence counsel. He suggests that without judges being
able to fall back on the solution of a constitutional exemption to a
mandatory minimum sentence in the individual case, it will be easier to
have the penalty struck down as grossly disproportionate. Hopefully115
this will breathe new life into section 12 challenges.
The judicial record since the Supreme Court in R. v. Smith116 struck
down the seven-year minimum sentence for importing a narcotic has
indeed thus far been one of retreat and timidity.117 There will be clear
challenges to the courts to dust off section 12 to put constitutional brakes
on Parliament’s new appetite for enacting minimum punishments at a
time when the United States courts and policy-makers have become
acutely aware of the danger, injustice and costs of such sentencing
rigidity. A strong candidate is the simplistic and ridiculous grid scheme
for sentencing for possession of marijuana for trafficking: mandatory 6
months for 6-200 plants, 1 year for 201-500 plants and 2 years for 501 or
more plants found at the time of the police raid. In R. v. Smickle,118
Molloy J. of the Ontario Superior Court recently used section 12 to strike
down a three-year minimum sentence where police entered a home
looking for another person and found the accused taking a picture of
himself holding a loaded handgun. That intrepid decision is under appeal.
The cat would be among the pigeons — or in this case among the
hawks — were our Court to follow the recent U.S. Supreme Court
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remedy119 of ordering the release of 3,700 prisoners to deal with overcrowding in California.
The Harper Government has consistently said it will not reintroduce
the death penalty. Yet, a recent poll120 finds that 49 per cent of Canadians
support the death penalty “for dangerous offenders”. In its impressive
judgment in United States of America v. Burns,121 the Court was unanimous in deciding that the Minister of Justice should not have agreed to
the extradition of Canadian citizens on aggravated first degree murder
charges in the state of Washington without obtaining assurances that the
death penalty would not be imposed. The issue was decided under
section 7. However, the Court added the following comment:
We are not called upon in this appeal to determine whether capital
punishment would, if authorized by the Canadian Parliament, violate
s. 12 of the Charter (“cruel and unusual treatment or punishment”), and
if so in what circumstances. It is, however, incontestable that capital
punishment, whether or not it violates s. 12 of the Charter, and whether
or not it could be upheld under s. 1, engages the underlying values of
the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. It is final. It is
irreversible. Its imposition has been described as arbitrary. Its deterrent
value has been doubted. Its implementation necessarily causes
psychological and physical suffering.122

It is salutary and another sign of the power of the Charter that the
Supreme Court is on record that it would likely find that the death
penalty would violate section 12.
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